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absTracT
This article proposes points of departure for researching the circulation and assem-
blage of racist ideas and racializing discourses in the trans-media space of inter-
active, hybrid digital media. It contends that racist mobilizations are increasingly 
invested in organized and opportunistic communicative actions that depend on the 
integration of interactive digital media to a wider media ecology and European 
political environment. Further, if social media can be understood as a constant 
‘invitation to discourse’, then they also provide an invitation to discourse on the 
nature and scope of racism in a putatively ‘post-racial’ era. In contending that the 
affordances and dynamics of social media networks are politically generative in rela-
tion to the politics of racism, it proposes working with malleable resources in the 
sociology of racism to develop approaches that are not limited to the established 
focus on extremist sites, but that can account both for the circuitries of digital media 
exchange and the particularities of regional racial formations.
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 1. Such exchanges 
have generated an 
extensive vocabulary 
for describing 
situated forms of 
destructive, unsettling 
or contrarian 
engagement. In 
Sharma’s quotation, 
the phrase ‘griefing’ 
refers to a concerted 
attempt to disrupt 
online communities. 
In this sense it was 
first used in online 
gaming networks to 
describe individual or 
collectively organized 
disruption of other 
players in multi-
player games, but has 
expanded to include, 
for example, organized 
interventions in 
Wikipedia’s crowd-
sourced editing 
processes, or Facebook 
pages maintained by 
identifiable interests, 
and so forth. The term 
‘trolling’ is similar, 
though it tends to be 
applied to disruptive 
interventions in the 
discursive flow of 
online discussions 
(through off-point, 
inflammatory, absurd, 
insulting or sarcastic 
interventions), and 
given its subjective 
quality, has become 
something of a floating 
signifier for a disparate 
range of engagements. 
 2. A hashtag is a word or 
phrase prefixed with 
the hashtag symbol 
# that allows Twitter 
users to coordinate, 
group and search 
for related posts and 
threads. Hashtags 
that are quantitatively 
popular or that are 
being applied to 
posts with significant 
temporal intensity 
may ‘trend’ on Twitter, 
i.e. be listed on the 
user interface as the 
top hashtags in the 
given (inter)national 
environment at a 
certain moment. For 
further details see 
Bruns and Burgess 
(2012).
inTroducTion
If Europe can be understood as a ‘new space of digital crossings’, an examina-
tion of this mediated and mediating trans-media space of diasporic commu-
nicative action must also approach it as a space of ‘cross-posting’; where 
‘migrants’ and diasporic subjects are endlessly racialized, and their presence 
abstracted and rendered as a productive political question for (European) 
majority deliberation. As Koen Leurs argues, ‘… digital spaces are not mute, 
neutral and external backdrops of identity formation, but distinct expres-
sive cultures filled with ideologies, hierarchies and politics’ (Leurs 2012: 22). 
Online communications and networked social media interactions provide 
key sites for the delineation of hierarchies of belonging, and the expansive 
rehearsal and contestation of racializing discourses, tropes and rationalities. 
The aim of this article is to complement the focus on ‘cultural crossings’ by 
integrating a focus on the settling and unsettling of racisms into the study of 
these convergent digital media spaces. 
In so doing, the conventional disclaimer that this article provides a limited 
and partial assessment is amplified by the challenges to theory posed by the 
‘turbulence of networked communications’ (Dean 2010: 1–3). Circuits of 
social media exchange,1 as Sanjay Sharma argues, generate a ‘racialized info-
overload’ of ‘casual racial banter, race-hate comments, “griefing”, images, 
videos and anti-racist sentiment (that) bewilderingly intermingle, mash-up 
and virally circulate’ (2013: 47). However, this article departs from the obser-
vation that, for the most part, this ‘racialized overload’ is currently marginal to 
research into racisms online. Arguably this is not only despite but also because 
of the ways in which networked digital media practices have – in a very literal 
sense – made the headlines over the last two years when it comes to the poli-
tics of racism. Three instances where social media dynamics have been instru-
mental in the racialization of diasporic populations develop this observation, 
after which the approach and structure of the article will be outlined. 
First, in autumn 2012, the film The Innocence of Muslims was posted on 
YouTube, the digital video sharing platform, and in a thinly veiled ‘parody’ 
of the life of the Prophet Mohammed, strung together a range of established 
forms of provocation, among them the depiction of Mohammed as a pedo-
phile. This ‘viral’ video sought to infect divergent body politics by stimulating 
latent conflicts over blasphemy, freedom of expression and the putative ‘limits’ 
of multiculturalism and legitimate presence in the public sphere. Shortly 
afterwards, international attention was drawn to the second example, a disa-
greement between the social networking/micro-blogging site Twitter and the 
French state and allied NGOs over the legality of tweets circulated under the 
hashtag2 #unbonjuif (‘a good Jew’) and #unjuifmort (‘a dead Jew’). The deci-
sion of the Union of Jewish Students of France to take legal action against 
Twitter – for refusing to disclose the identities of account holders deemed to 
have broken French laws prohibiting Holocaust denial – focused much of this 
international coverage on the tension between Twitter’s recourse to a First 
Amendment defence of free speech, and public communications in European 
jurisdictions with explicit – if complex – laws on hate speech (Edwards and 
Matwhshyn 2013; see also Bleich 2011). However #unbonjuif emerged in an 
overlapping sequence of trending hashtags – #UnGayMort (‘a Dead Gay’) 
#simonfilsestgay (‘if my son is gay’), #simafillerameneunoir (‘if my daughter 
brought home a black man’) – that stoked intensive discussion about the 
conduct of public debate in France during 2012 and early 2013.
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The third and most significant event to draw concerted attention to digital 
media-based racist activity was the circulation of Anders Behring Breivik’s 
hyper-textual compendium 2083 in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of July 
22 2011. Frequently described as a ‘manifesto’ in media reports, Breivik circu-
lated his document to a selected readership on the morning of the attacks, and 
it combines diary entries, weapons information and a survey of anti-Muslim 
conspiracy theories with a call for a final victory over multiculturalism and Muslim 
invasion by the year 2083 (see Titley 2013). Within days of the attacks, the politi-
cal blog Think Progress had produced a simple visualization of gross citations 
(see Clifton 2011), showing how Breivik had drawn ideological sustenance and 
textual resources from a dense and predominantly transatlantic network of the 
‘counter-jihad blogosphere’ (Lean 2012). This precipitated an intensive debate 
not only about ‘lone wolf terrorism’ and online radicalization but also about the 
moral and ideological responsibilities those cited may have for the compendium 
author’s actions (see Bartlett and Soremshaugen 2012; Titley 2013). 
As Geert Lovink has argued, ‘new media have definitively passed beyond an 
introductory phase, but they continue to clash with existing social and political 
structures, as corporations and traditional knowledge institutions face the disrup-
tive implications of networking’ (2011: 2). Faced with these political disruptions, 
dominant responses sought to restore these digital media irruptions to the side-
lines of a properly functional public sphere. Meredith Tax, in emphasizing the 
Innocence of Muslims’ aesthetic limitations and hyper-trolling intent, summarizes 
a prevalent recourse to rational restraint when she argued that ‘the film was 
designed to insult, but nobody forces people to go crazy when their religion 
is insulted’ (2012). The French Minister for Women’s Affairs, Najat Vallaud-
Belkacem argued in a widely quoted 2012 Le Monde article that the cumulative 
hashtag activity listed above represented an ‘absolute contradiction of the values 
of our Republic’. And after Utøya, many commentators overlaid the presumed 
psychopathology of the killer onto the projected political pathologies of the anti-
Muslim blog network, deadly but marginal phenomena when compared to the 
trans-partisan unity of Norwegian society’s response (Bangstad 2013). 
Yet there is a double elision at play here, beyond the re-centring impulses 
detected by Lovink. The ‘virtual and immaterial racism’ (Gilroy 2012: 382) 
generated and contested in and through social media platforms and digital 
spaces also disrupt social and political structures by complicating official 
imaginaries of post-racial societies, and generating new events, spaces and 
scripts through which racisms are configured and rehearsed. The Innocence of 
Muslims, for example, certainly sought to detonate ideological fault lines in the 
political tumult of Egypt and Libya. But, by seeking to emulate the strategy of, 
for example, the Dutch right-wing member of parliament Geert Wilders’ anti-
Islamic visual pamphlet Fitna, it was designed to rekindle intensive and often 
coded debates on the boundaries of European values and civilization that 
have resulted from other rapidly circulated visual representations of Muslim 
‘incompatibility’ (for a discussion of the dissemination strategy for Fitna, 
which was originally published on Liveleak and recirculated on YouTube, and 
subsequent contestation strategies, see Liesbet van Zoonen et al. 2011). 
While the hate expressed on Twitter undoubtedly runs contrary to the stated 
values of the Republic, these values are not stable; the dissonance between the 
stated values of the Republic and the social and political status of French citi-
zens issus de l’immigration is a key site for ‘decolonial’ and diasporic contesta-
tion of racialization and marginalization in France (Khiari 2006). And, while 
Breivik’s ideological formation is heavily indebted to what Nathan Lean has 
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recently termed the transatlantic ‘Islamophobia Industry’ (2012), the Foreign 
Policy contributor Paul Hockenos was not alone in relating Breivik’s obsessions 
to a much broader and ideologically striated anti-Muslim racism, where the 
‘… political mainstreaming of Islamophobia would have been inconceivable 
without the post-9/11 anti-Islamic discourse across European media and the 
blogosphere. In large part, this trail was blazed by intellectuals who defended 
their positions in the name of liberalism and human rights’ (2012).
These thinly sketched examples are offered here in broad, heuristic terms, 
for they open out three key dimensions of researching the settling and unset-
tling of racisms in convergent digital media spaces. First, racist mobilizations 
and practices are heavily invested in organized and opportunistic commu-
nicative actions that recognize and depend on the integration of interactive 
digital media to a wider media ecology and European political environment. 
As Jessie Daniels notes, ‘the internet is a site of political struggle over racial 
meaning, knowledge and values’ (2012:10). This is clear, but these struggles 
on the ‘Internet’ – the intensive production and circulation of scripts, tropes, 
memes, images, references, and ‘facts’ – are increasingly folded into a broader 
politics of racism, and need to be treated as such. 
Second, and concomitantly, this environment is marked by intensive, 
mediatized conversations and contests as to the scope, nature and legitimacy 
of the idea of ‘racism’. Social media, as Nick Couldry argues constitute a ubiq-
uitous ‘invitation to discourse’ through their formal properties, integration 
into the wider media system, and ambient and banal integration into everyday 
practices (2012). This invitation is intensively extended in relation to mobiliz-
ing political events and news items pertaining to, for instance, immigration 
and multiculturalism. More broadly, social media interaction provides key 
sites for everyday explorations of the confusion and contestation of racisms in 
a political moment frequently characterized as ‘post-racial’ (Goldberg 2009). 
The constant ‘invitation to discourse’, then, is also a constant conflict of defi-
nition in a putatively ‘post-racial’ era, and a contest over who gets to define, 
when everyone gets to speak. 
Third, these examples illustrate how the affordances and dynamics of social 
media networks are politically generative – from the new modes of globally 
accretive propaganda events hosted by YouTube (Van Zoonen et al. 2011); to 
the dynamics of emergent ‘hashtag publics’ (Bruns and Burgess 2012) over-
compressed time and in reflexive relation to wider publics; to the post-22/7 anxi-
ety in Norway and Europe over the ways in which news-site comment threads, 
Facebook pages and other interactive spaces further mediate and disseminate 
the scripts and tropes of the anti-Muslim blogosphere (Andersson 2012). 
In what follows, this article aims to make a limited and initial contribution to 
identifying key directions for analysing social media’s ‘racialized info-overload’, 
in the context of an involved ‘resurgence’ of racism in Europe. In the next section, 
I argue for thinking through productive metaphors of racism’s complexity and 
mutability as ways of building approaches to the flow and exchange of digital 
media networks across overlapping but different geopolitical and spatio-tempo-
ral modes of race making. This is particularly important given the predominant 
focus in the current literature on North American racial formations.
racial debris, mashed‑up 
‘Mediatized conversations about race’ Lisa Nakamura and Peter A. Chow-
White observe, ‘whether on the Internet with human interlocutors or with 
the torrent of digitized media texts, have become an increasingly important 
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channel for discourse about our differences’ (2012: 5). These conversa-
tions, from highly strategized and networked interventions, to concentrated 
communicative engagement with transnationally suggestive events, to the 
everyday generativity of the ‘perpetual machine’ of comment cultures (Lovink 
2012), also rehearse, extend and refine the vocabularies, codes and strate-
gies through which everyday racializations are enforced, and, increasingly, 
through which broader public conversations are inflected. In Europe at this 
political conjuncture, where anxieties over security, individualized autonomy 
and cultural (in)compatibility intermesh in the complex racial politics of the 
‘War on Terror’ decade, such conversations frequently convene and cohere 
around racializing evaluations of the legitimacy of diasporic presence (Lentin 
and Titley 2011). 
Consequently, analysis of the digital production and circulation of racisms 
must involve approaches that are attentive to the form, dynamics, affordances 
and techno-social dimensions of specific media forms and practices. However, 
as the introductory examples suggest, social media ‘disruptions’ are, increas-
ingly, politically generative, and the mediatization (see Couldry and Hepp 
2013) of racism – and the ways in which it is contested and understood in the 
multiple, overlapping media spaces that condition public debate – involves 
far more than the simple extension of racist practices and counter-strug-
gles online. Arguably, contemporary racisms cannot be understood without 
greater attention to their mediation, as ‘mediatized conversations about race’ 
are integral to shaping racism in an era where the discourse of what racism is 
and who gets to define it, and in what ways, is so unstable. 
If this contention has validity, then arguably the political generativity of 
social media, and the wider circuits of ‘racialized info-overload’ theorized by 
Sharma (2013), extend and retrench the pronounced elisions identified by 
Daniels (2012) in her recent review of ‘race and racism in Internet Studies’: 
‘The Internet has not provided an escape route from either race or racism, 
nor has the study of race or racism proven to be central to the field of Internet 
Studies’ (2012: 2). While racism has not been central to the wider field, the 
preponderance of research into racism online in Europe and the United States 
has centred on the development, mobilizing possibilities and discursive adap-
tations of far-right and supremacist sites. In Western Europe, the early years 
of ‘Web 1.0’ overlapped with the period described by the political scientist 
Cas Mudde (2004) as the ‘populist zeitgeist’ in Nordic and Alpine Europe. 
Consequently, multiple studies have examined the online strategies of far-
right movements and populist parties in this period. Clare Bratten (2005), for 
example, has demonstrated the importance of web presence to the French 
Front National in the years preceding Jean Marie Le Pen’s progress to the 
final round of the Presidential election of 2002. In his recent study of the 
British National Party, Matthew Goodwin (2011) examines the influence of 
the FN’s strategy on that of the BNP, which, he argues, had one of the most 
successful web strategies of the period. 
Studies of the extreme right online have burgeoned in the United States, 
focusing, as Daniels summarizes, on two broad categories of racist activity 
online: ‘(1) overt hate Web sites that target individuals or groups, showcase 
racist propaganda, or offer online community for white supremacists; and (2) 
cloaked Web sites that intentionally seek to deceive the casual Web user’ (2008: 
129, original emphasis). Many comparative studies have been conducted of 
groups based in or networked to Europe, and these studies have employed 
discourse analysis and theories of alternative media (Atton 2006) to exam-
ine the development of, inter alia, what Priscilla Meddaugh and Jack Kay 
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 3. The work of 
O’Callaghan et al. 
(2012) proposes 
several interesting 
methodologies 
for examining the 
networking of right-
wing extremist sites to 
Twitter, and extremist 
clusters within 
Twitter networks. 
The think-tank 
Demos has recently 
produced a series of 
studies examining 
the Facebook page 
information strategies 
and interactions 
of populist right 
parties in Europe, see 
http://www.demos.
co.uk/publications/
insidetheedl.
(2009) term the ‘tempered, pseudo-rational, reasonable racism’ of adaptive, 
legitimating strategies more attuned to the post-racial consensus. 
Researching these actors, of course, remains crucially important, and 
research3 is beginning to address how, as the London-based Institute of Race 
Relations’ 2012 report ‘Pedlars of Hate: The Violent Impact of the European 
Far-Right’ notes, ‘The new social media allows the far Right an important 
new way to increase its support-base and to disseminate conspiracy theories, 
and the pattern of violence often starts with intimidation against Black 
and Minority Ethnic communities and political opponents in the virtual 
world’ (2012: 7). However, if research on racism as a dimension of political 
extremism – increasingly framed through academic and institutional attention 
to ‘radicalization’ online – is beginning to address the impact of the broader 
social web, there is, as Andrew Jacubowicz notes in another 2012 survey 
article, an absence of studies that examine how ‘racist mobilization has been 
extended through Twitter, Facebook and SMS communication’. 
Beyond the study of organized and networked extremism, Daniels’ evalu-
ation of a general lack of focus on race and racism in Internet Studies could be 
extended to note that there is scant attention to issues beyond North American 
racial formations, while this positioning is rarely acknowledged in overviews 
of the field. As Nakamura and Chow-White contend in their recent (2012) 
survey, ‘critical race studies must take account of the digital, and digital media 
and technology studies must take account of race’ (2012: 6), and they advocate 
a deepening of the interdisciplinary work that ‘started with a forceful critique 
of the utopian discourse that characterized early digital media studies’ (2012: 
7). Daniels (2012), and Nakamura and Chow-White’s (2012) overviews are 
comprehensive and timely, mapping accounts of race in shifting understand-
ings of the socio-economic factors shaping access and ‘racial digital divides’, 
and turning towards accounts of ‘digital segregations’ in social network sites; 
the racialization of technologies and interfaces and an evolving focus on 
‘race as code’ in biotechnology and infomatics; identity discourses, racialized 
communities and formations, and the shift from consuming to performing 
and contesting stereotypes in an evolving, interactive politics of representation 
played out in games, virtual spaces and user-generated communities. 
The vast preponderance of this work is focused on approaching race in rela-
tion to US racial formations; indeed Nakamura and Chow-White’s collection 
is explicitly situated in relation to the ‘postracial’ paradox whereby ‘Obama’s 
presidency coincides with some of the most racist immigration legislation 
seen in recent years, as a well as a prison industrial complex that continues 
to thrive and target black males, and a financial and housing crisis that has 
disproportionately harmed black and Latino Americans (2012: 1). The politics 
of race and racism in Europe only features substantively in these reviews in 
Daniels’ discussion of the disjuncture between the free expression/hate speech 
provisions referenced in the introductory French example (2012: 12–13). 
However, as both surveys emphasize, social media networks are producing 
an intensified transnational and trans-media environment, one where simply 
transposing an imaginary of geopolitical space onto racially productive digital 
networks – to produce a ‘European research agenda’ – is as limiting as unre-
flective applications of the North American-focused literature. The analysis of 
racism, as Ian Law outlines in his study of post-communist contexts, requires 
‘… maintaining a careful balance between specifying both the autonomous 
forms of ideas, behaviours and practices and identifying (their) complex inter-
connections, interrelations and intersections’ (2012: 3).
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On the specific question of racisms produced and circulated within social 
media’s networks of exchange, Daniels notes how the ‘overwhelming major-
ity of the research reviewed’ in her survey ‘… focuses on some aspect of racial 
identity, while only a small portion focuses on everyday expressions of racism 
on the Internet’ (2012: 15). Arguably, the unifying nature of this lack may allow 
for ways forward. In addressing this neglect, the challenge for studies that exam-
ine racism in European trans-media space is to develop approaches that can 
account for configurations of racist practice, racializing mediations and flows of 
racial meaning that accumulate across networked sites, while examining for the 
particularities of their assembly and force in given exchanges and contexts. 
One point of entry into this challenge is to think with those theorizations of 
racism that have productive affinities with the networked, archiving and remedi-
ating dimensions of social media. Racism, as John Solomos and Les Back argue, 
is a ‘scavenger ideology, which gains its power from the ability to pick out and 
utilize ideas and values from other sets of ideas and beliefs in specific socio-
historical contexts’ (1996: 213). Digital spaces provide sites of abundance for this 
scavenger work, and do so within a transnational media space characterized by 
the travel, translation and appropriation of issues, images, tropes, memes, strate-
gies and associations. Scavenger work, then, has obvious affinities with the argu-
ment that bricolage – the combination of disparate elements in new forms, with 
a particular emphasis in this sense on multi-media combinations – comprises a 
defining feature of digital media culture (Deuze 2006; Lievrouw 2011). 
Yet, much as the recombination, juxtaposition and pastiche of elements 
that informs bricolage as a subversive technique requires an adversarial rela-
tionship to dominant ideologies and hegemonic arrangements, the coher-
ing register of scavenger work must be accounted for. Back and Solomos’s 
contention that power is accumulated through purposive selection in specific 
socio-historical contexts is not invalidated simply by the fact of the radical 
abundance of the Internet. As Sara Ahmed argues in her discussion of ‘affec-
tive economies’ of hate and the media coverage of asylum-seekers, we must 
account for ‘stickiness in circuitries of hate’, where ‘figures of hate circulate, 
and indeed accumulate their affective value, precisely insofar as they do not 
have a fixed referent’ (2004: 47). What is scavenged must also stick, and this 
must be explained; how associations become attached to particular bodies 
through repetition, how they gain credence and shed their histories of social 
construction, and are reproduced – in this instance in relation to asylum-seek-
ers – in powerful narratives of threat, loss and invasion. 
Stickiness, therefore, implies not only moments of discursive concentra-
tion and circulation in networks of exchange, but also historically generated 
repertoires, vocabularies, indices and symbolic relations that, to extend the 
metaphor, have varying degrees of adhesiveness according to the context of 
production and reception. In another suggestive metaphor, Ash Amin (2010) 
offers the notion of ‘racial debris’ as a way of approaching the re-articulation 
of racial references, orders and logics held to be ‘past’ but which recur – and 
are remediated – in the ‘current racial present’. Amin’s purpose in his article 
‘The remainders of race’ is to examine the temporality of race, and to explore 
the conditions in which ‘mixes of past and present racial practices become 
especially vengeful towards the racialized other’ (2010: 3). Amin presents a 
temporality of race that imbricates ‘newness, repetition and immanence’:
… first, a restless impulse of variety and novelty, always disrupting and 
challenging settled patterns of racial formation and behavior; second, 
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the potential to return sameness if the forces of repetition are strong, 
perhaps organized and channeled; and third, the potentiality of accu-
mulated racial debris, variegated and dormant from different eras, ready 
to be instantiated in unknown ways.
(2010: 5)
Trans-media spaces provide extensive opportunities to sift and assemble 
debris, debris that can be drawn from an extended archive and repertoire of 
racial conceptions and associations given that ‘the visual turn and the techno-
logical turn are converging as images migrate and proliferate onto digital plat-
forms’ (Nakamura and Chow-White 2012: 5). The following section provides 
an example of how these ideas may provide a basis for an analysis of commu-
nicative forms, dynamics and racializing discourse. 
debris, evenT, form
In a recent edition of the Australian cultural and political journal Overland, the 
journalist and activist Malcolm Harris described Twitter as a ‘global city made 
of text’ (2012). One of his illustrative ‘walks through a city made of words’ 
involved the short-lived twitter account @Anti_Racism_Dog, suspended by 
Twitter after multiple complaints from those targeted by the account. @Anti_
Racism_Dog’s mode of interaction never varied; it barked at racists. As Harris 
argues, the unsettling quality of @Anti_Racism_Dog is the account’s complete 
simulation of the character of an animal; it barks, and just keeps barking, 
regardless of attempts at engagement. It is this complete refusal of engage-
ment in an interactive medium that is crucial, but its significance requires 
some explanation, and is developed here through an analysis of one particular 
interaction.
In this May 2012 exchange, Twitter user @SmashTheSystem tweeted:
Fascist multiculturalist scum demotes fire captain for STATING HIS 
OPINION, while off-duty, on his facebook page cbsn.ws/KLdoAu 
#WPWW
@SmashTheSystem’s initiating tweet refers and links to a story concern-
ing Brian Beckmann, a Miami Dade fire captain, who was demoted for 
a Facebook status update posted in the aftermath of the fatal shooting of 
Trayvon Martin in February 2012 by George Zimmerman, a neighbourhood 
watch volunteer. In his update, Beckmann wrote: ‘I and my co-workers could 
rewrite the book on whether our urban youths are victims of racist profil-
ing or products of their failed, (deleted expletive) ignorant pathetic welfare 
dependent excuses for parents’. Beckmann’s status update compresses some 
of the key elisions of what Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2006) terms ‘color-blind 
racism’ in the US context, both denying the salience of racial profiling to 
Martin’s murder, while drawing on what Dana-Ain Davis (2007) calls the 
‘racial indexing’ that renders references to ‘welfare’ or ‘quotas’ as intelligible 
only in terms of the presumed, perpetual dependency of undeserving African 
Americans on the state. 
@SmashTheSystem’s outrage is motivated by Beckmann’s demo-
tion, effected despite his defensive contention that he had cut and paste 
the comment to his Facebook page from a comment site, thus lessening 
the responsibility of authorial intent through the distance of remediation. 
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Countering the municipal disciplinary investigation’s contention that there 
is ‘no such thing as being off-the-clock’ for public servants in a multi-eth-
nic community, @SmashTheSystem posits the Facebook comment as having 
been made when off-duty, a condition deemed sufficient to resolve the 
‘privately public and publicly private’ ambivalence of social media postings 
(Papacharissi 2010: 142). 
@SmashTheSystem’s generic complaint of ‘fascist multiculturalism’ 
locates his reaction in a broad, transatlantic terrain of anti-multiculturalist 
sentiment, where ‘multiculturalism’ functions as a capacious signifier of aver-
sion and discontent (Lentin and Titley 2011). His hashtag, #WPWW is far less 
amorphous, as it stands for ‘White Pride World Wide’, a supremacist acro-
nym that pre-dates its hash-tag use. As Axel Bruns and Jean Burgess suggest, 
‘using a hashtag can be seen as an explicit attempt to address an imagined 
community of users’ (2012: 804). Hash-tagging this story, in this way, seeks 
to position it as yet more evidence, globally accreted, of ideological assaults 
on white supremacy, testimony provided to anybody who may establish a 
communal connection to activity under the hashtag. In their study of social 
media use among dedicated extreme right groups, Derek O’Callaghan et al. 
located heavy use of #WPWW among white power/white supremacist groups 
in the United States, and at the time of their study, noted the ancillary use 
of a #trayvontruth hashtag, where ‘it appears that this story is being used to 
propagate a message of alleged persecution against whites’ (2012: 7). 
#WPWW is both heavily mediated within North American white power and 
national socialist networks, and also an acronym used to coordinate ‘global’ 
events and activities by supremacist groups around the (western) world. As 
a hashtag, it is visible and searchable for Twitter users and web browsers 
beyond those who actively associate with and in relation to it. Perhaps as a 
result of surveillance of this hashtag, @Anti_Racism_Dog tweeted three times 
in response in quick succession: 
AWOOO AWOOOO woof wooof 
AWOOOOOOOO AWOOOO WOOF WOOF AWOOOO 
Awooo wfooof woof
In response, @SmashTheSystem tweets back a series of responses:
- tell me what’s racist about supporting free speech
- 1. The belief that race accounts 4 differences in human character or ability 
and that a particular race is superior to others
- 2. Discrimination or prejudice based on race
- i’m directly challenging you to tell me what’s racist about what I just 
posted
These responses go unanswered, until @Anti_Racism_Dog tweets:
AWOOO AWOOOO woof wooof AWOOOOOOOO
When challenged, @SmashTheSystem’s purposive appeal to an avowedly 
supremacist hashtag ‘community’ is relegated to the status of debris from the 
past in favour of adopting the tweeting position of what Ruth Wodak has 
called the ‘victimized majority’, and rehearsing the key discursive strategies of 
what have come, over the last decades, to be called ‘new racism’ or ‘cultural 
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racism’. The previous appeal to white pride is effaced through what John 
Durham Peters (2005) calls the ‘recursive’ nature of debates about ‘freedom 
of expression’ – that is, the particular issue in question is frequently subsumed 
to a debate about the guiding, and abstract, normative principle. Freedom of 
speech provides a scavenging defence, shifting the focus onto a question that 
has become central to debates about Internet freedom (see Herz and Molnar 
2012), and one where the recursive turn strengthens the idea that the ‘victim-
ized majority’ is being unfairly treated. 
In the two definitions subsequently offered, @smashthesystem explicitly 
distances itself from understandings of racism as tied to pseudo-science and 
explicit forms of racial hierarchy. Having established such reasonable distance, 
telling uncomfortable truths cannot, by definition, be racist. Thus any attempt 
to counter its arguments in such terms involves censorship, ‘politically correct’ 
bullying by a multicultural elite, reverse racism, and a repertoire of other such 
claims. This repertoire is anything but novel: two recent works of intellectual 
history in the United States – Daniel Rodgers’ Age of Fracture (2012) and Corey 
Robins’ The Reactionary Mind (2011) both emphasize how the conservative 
right in the United States prospered politically in the post civil rights period by 
‘absorbing and transmuting the idioms’ and analytical approaches of progres-
sive movements. Thus, in specific pursuit of white privilege, the conserva-
tive intellectuals of the period drew on the established tactic of presenting 
any challenge to existing inequalities as a paradoxical form of victimhood, 
while also assimilating and inverting philosophies of cultural recognition and 
constructivist critiques. 
Older, seminal works of European sociology have also emphasized these 
forms of reflexive capture. The so-called ‘neo-racism’ specified since the 1970s 
by Étienne Balibar (1991), Martin Barker (1982) and others differed from 
racism as conventionally understood through its apparent post-Holocaust 
rejection of racial hierarchy in favour of appropriating the putatively progres-
sive idea of a ‘right to difference’. Cultural recognition, like immigration, is 
posited as a zero-sum game – to give to a minority inevitably involves taking 
from a majority, and it is in this move that the power relations of recognition-
based philosophies are inverted. 
However, given that these tactics are structured as a series of counter- 
arguments directed at supposed multiculturalist hegemony, what is signifi-
cant is the opportunity structure provided by social media forms for the 
extension of these discursive strategies. The posts on Twitter by @Anti_
Racism_Dog are shaped as a response to these strategies, as it explicitly 
denies an opportunity to mount a defence against the ‘unfair accusation’ of 
racism, a point of departure critical to this ‘post-racial’ discursive formation. 
@Anti_Racism_Dog refuses a turn-taking flow, forcing @smashthesystem to 
rehearse counter-arguments in a void. As Harris points out, ‘although these 
moves are predictable, they’re hard to combat rhetorically since they’re able 
to ingest the conventional opposition scripts’ (2012). @Anti_Racism_Dog 
recognizes the condition of the script’s stickiness, and by leaving @smashth-
esystem without an answer, ensures that it must project the necessary oppo-
sitional scripts, and is rendered absurd by accusing a barking dog of being 
against freedom of speech. By refusing to allow @smashthesystem to reduce 
the exchange to one of personal outrage at an unfair accusation, the strategy 
of @Anti_Racism_Dog is to recall that racism is a question of practices, not 
intent, and has to be ‘comprehended in terms of its consequences, not as a 
matter of intentions or beliefs’ (Winant 2005). 
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What is of interest in this extended example is that @Anti_Racism_Dog, 
as a digital artefact, displays a political and analytical understanding of the 
interdependence of discursive strategy and communicative form. The inter-
action between both users illustrates the compressed sorting and sifting of 
‘racial debris’, assembled and countered when concentrated in reaction to a 
contentious event. While the killing of Trayvon Martin must be firmly under-
stood within the violence and disavowal of the US (post)racial order, the racial 
repertoires, discursive formations and mediating forms and conventions are 
not limited to this mapping. Instead, they suggest ways of thinking about 
connectivities and overlaps that allow for an attention both to what David 
Goldberg terms ‘racial regionalizations’ (2009: 67–70) and to the circuitries 
of exchange in digital media. Nevertheless, the question remains as to what 
issues such a regionalization would focus on in relation to contemporary 
European trans-media space. 
conclusion: europe and racism beyond The ‘siTe’
‘Racism’, according to Malcolm X, ‘… is like a Cadillac, they bring out a new 
model every year’ (see Lipsitz 2006: 183). Malcolm X’s caustic metaphor unset-
tles complacent investments in visions of historical progress towards a post-
racial settlement. It also underlines the fact of racism’s ongoing production 
and the purposive nature of ‘scavenging’. Its emphasis on the historical muta-
bility of modes of oppression also underlines the critical urgency of address-
ing research gaps in the mediation and discursive production of racisms. The 
digital production and circulation of racisms within networked public cultures 
is significant because they are politically generative beyond the simple ‘exten-
sion’ of racist discourse and practices into more and varied communicative 
forms and sites. This article has suggested that contemporary racisms cannot 
be understood without an integrated examination of how ‘mediatized conver-
sations about race’ are central to shaping racism in an era where the discourse 
of what racism is and who gets to define it, and in what ways, is so contested 
and unstable. 
Consequently, moving beyond a dominant focus on the ‘extremist site’ is 
important not only in grasping political processes of mediation and mobiliza-
tion, but in unsettling the idea that extremists sites, and thus extremist groups, 
form the exceptional loci of racism in contemporary Europe. This over-deter-
mining focus is arguably vulnerable to the reproduction of a post-racial logic, 
and therefore the focus on ‘sites’ must be integrated into a more fluid consid-
eration of circulation, transposition and translation in a trans-media environ-
ment. What is required now – as the example of @anti_racism_dog suggests 
– is more focus on how the strategies and discourses honed in these spaces 
and communities of mobilization are disseminated through the arteries and 
capillaries of networked publics. The challenge for studies that examine racism 
in European trans-media space is to develop approaches that can account 
for configurations of racist practice, racializing mediations and flows of racial 
meaning that accumulate across networked sites, while examining for the 
particularities of their assembly and force in given exchanges and contexts. 
An adequate survey of trajectories of racialization in Europe is clearly 
beyond the scope of an article such as this, yet a useful starting point is to note 
that, much as Nakamura and Chow-White (2012) can locate their review in 
the context of a post-racial disjuncture, attention to racial discourse in Europe 
must depart from an account of the European post-racialism that has, in part, 
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limited the parameters within which research is conducted. As Barnor Hesse 
argues in his historical account of ‘postracial horizons’, within the European 
Union ‘… signifiers of a postracial horizon have found their most elaborate 
expressions in those institutional and urban domains where political indict-
ments of race and racism are either regularly disavowed or casually identified 
as anachronisms’ (2011: 1). In other words, the political story of Europe is 
narrated as one of exceptional progress beyond the dark horizon of twentieth 
century Nazi – and to a far lesser extent, colonial – racisms. In other words 
again, there is nothing to worry about since we stopped producing what are 
dominantly recognized as Cadillacs. Yet, depending on the position of the 
narrator, this prevalent story takes no account of punitive asylum-regimes 
and securitized immigration systems (Tyler 2012); of the concerted and racial-
izing focus on ‘diasporic’ Europeans compatibility with putatively European 
values and practices; and the re-production of ‘Europe’ as a racial horizon (see 
Goldberg 2009).
Arguably, then, future research could begin to conceive of networked 
social media interactions, which are reactive to and generative of mediated 
events and antagonistic concentrations of public definition and evaluation, 
as a discourse laboratory within which the terms of post-racial disavowal 
and antiracist contestation are being played out, and developed; within a 
transnational media space that generates a broad repertoire of issues, asso-
ciations and ‘debris’ for possible translation and transposition; and within 
which the ‘cultural crossings’ of those who are so easily defined or recalled 
as ‘Other to Europe’ involve negotiating and contesting the racialized 
overload. 
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